THE NEED FOR ETHICS
BY OLAF STAPLEDON
an age of
IS A commonplace that ours
ITthat
we follow on an age of complacency.

disillusionment, and

is

In the days before

war optimism was maintained only by setting the telescope to the
For, apart from the social problem, which few even in
blind eye.
those days could entirely shun, three less urgent but more subtly
the

disturbing troubles were becoming widely noticed.

even by the plain

Pirst,

was

the universe

must outgrow

man

was beginning

it

indifferent to

human

to be suspected that

desires.

his trust in a celestial protagonist,

Man,

it

seemed,

and must depend on

himself alone both for his daily comfort and for the achievement of
his ideals.

Second,

it

was already rumored

to failure but also to insincerity.

that

man was doomed

He was

not only

charged with being

at

heart careless of everything but the satisfaction of crude animal instincts.

He

valued his ideals,

we were

told,

only so far as they

afforded "symbolical fulfillment" to his primitive cravings.
if this vew of human nature were
judgments of ethical good and evil were vitiated. For when
ever we judged anything to be objectively good, our value- judgment
was determined (it was said), not by the objective character and
relations of the thing itself as a whole, but by some superficial and
irrevelant feature which happened to stimulate instinctive or childhood cravings. Thus the considered judgments from which the
ethical distinction was derived appeared invalid as data for ethics.
And this view, that the distinction between good and bad was after
all meaningless, was also strongly suggested by the chaotic state of
ethical theory itself.
For some writers defined "good" in one way,
and some in others. Some on the other hand, said it was indefinable
and some explained it in such a modern and "scientific" manner

Third, and m)ost unsettling,

true, all

;
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that they explained

it

away.

Thus

the very distinction on which any

must be based, the distinction which religion and common sense
alike had assumed to be objective and universal, was beginning to
seem arbitrary. All causes, all ideals, all obligations and enthusiasms
were susoect in the suspicion that "goodness" itself was after all
ideal

meaningless.

Such were the three doubts, cosmological, psychological, and
that were creeping into the minds of thoughtful persons
even in that distant age which ended in 1914. Today they are more

ethical,

prevalent.

Now

the

anxiety

first

of these questions

During the

portance.

rise

of

is

modern

perhaps of no great imscience

there

the intelligentsia as to whether the world

among

was much
was really

or as to whether it was "on our side" or
more intelligent were as yet only beginning to wake
from the dreams of the more naive religious orthodoxy, this issue
was bound to seem urgent. Today we are perhaps no nearer an
answer than in the days when Huxley first opposed the ethical to the
cosmical but we are more ready to shelve the question and tackle
For it becomes clear that, if by "world" we mean
other matters.
"the whole of being", the answer must wait until we know something

good, bad or indifferent

When

not.

;

the

;

Moreover, the idtimate fate of our
remote and less important than
now
more
seems
race and
the
vastness
of the future. But if by
realised
in the days before we
becoming reconciled to
are
is
meant
the
natural
world,
we
"world"
mother, is more
ever-fascinating
that
our
Nature,
the knowledge
of the real nature of that whole.

our ideals

resourceful than virtuous.

We

begin to cease from looking to her

model or as a protagonist. True to the modern fashion in
filial piety, we are prone rather to correct than respect her.
It is for
us. not for her to say what it is that is good, and to discover if posAs to her maternal
sible whether or not goodness is but a delusion.
protection, we are alternately braced and grieved to find that we must
depend on ourselves alone. But we are no longer appalled.

either as a

The cosmological
haps

it

gets.

question thus deserves less attention than per-

For. granted that the good-bad distinction

and moral

is

valid,

must simply be
brought to heel, — animal that she is.
But as to the Whole,
whether it is "on our side" or not, how dare we pass judgment on
it?
F"or, granted the validity of the ethical distinction, none but
a universally informed mind is entitled to judge the universe. It is
Nature, as our intellectual

inferior,
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possible that, though in our ethical distinction

we

versal principle, yet that zvhich in the cosmical view

truly grasp a uni-

must be seen

to be

beyond the appreciative powers of our little minds. Much
that seemed to Queen Victoria very bad is judged by us to be very
good. Yet (though some of us easily forget it) the difference between the Queen's horizon and our own is perhaps less than the difference between ours and the span of all being. Who are we, that
we should judge the heavens by our childish values? Shall we, because the "gods" neither please us nor make themselves intelligible to
Parents, it is said, are justified
us, dub them insensitive or stupid?

good

far

is

in fulfilling, not
if

merely

in pleasing their children.

And

the "gods",

there be such, are to be justified not by the sweets they give us,

indeed are very simple children, but by the judgment of the
fnllv enlightened mind, which may (conceivably) be theirs, but very

who

surely

is

not ours.

logical question

For these reasons

it is

as well to leave the

cosmo-

untouched.

But the other two questions rightly become more insistent in the
In the days when the teaching of
plain man's mind every year.
the churches was accepted at least intellectually by the congregations (and even by the great uncongregated) there was no ethical
problem in the plain man's mind. Spiritual advisers told him what

was good, and he accepted their verdict, in theory, if not
Love was the good and the plain man accepted is
not because he saw that it was so, but because the churches
God had said it was so.
tice.

;

Even before

the war, however, very

many had

in prac-

as good,
said that

already ceased to

take their professed religion seriously, even on the side of theory.

The

startling

and bracing discoveries of science began

incredulous of the old teaching, even

if

to

make

us

also far too credulous of the

But perhaps the main effect of science was that it made the old
For the doctrine of science was
trite and even childish.
austere while the doctrine of the old faith was by now padded over
with comfortable devices. Comfort cannot stir us to loyalty. Thus,
while to some the orthodox view was merely unbelievable, to others,
though they had accepted it as true, it had ceased to be commanding.
Consequently, while in some quarters there was a purely intellectual
scepticism, in others there was a purely emotional disillusionment.
Elsewhere these two dissatisfactions were combined. And so the
ethical questions began to whisper themselves in many minds.
Those who felt most strongly the objective validity of the good-bad
new.

hopes look
;
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distinction, but

had

lost the old faith,

theory not incompatible with their

craved most eagerly an ethical

Those who

new cosmology.

were still intuitively convinced that love was the best thing in the
world sought some justification other than the word of a God
whose existence they were beginning to doubt.
Then came the war. It gave us something large to do and vivid
to think.
It pushed those doubts from the focus of our attention.
Already in the years before the war the only vivid ideal was nationaland patriotism was tlie only compelling religion. The one thing
bigger than themselves which most men could both believe in and
care for was their "country" and they readily accepted the war as
the supreme religious rite of sacrifice to their romantic god.
It is true, of course, that the motives that led men to fight were
ism,

;

diverse.

Not

in all,

perhaps not in many, was

impulse the main factor.

this strictly religious

ATany, no doubt, went simply to stamp out

seemed to threaten their homes and all whom
Some, on the other hand, went to escape the tyranny
of the economic mill
some to escape mere boredom some to be
quit of their families or their friends
some to assert their manhood in the eyes of women. The white feather flicked their selfesteem, and drove them to accept without enthusiasm the sacrament
imposed by the only living orthodox faith, the faith in nationalism.
But these, who fought primarily for their own good name and not
for the romantic ideal, would never have been herded into khaki had
they not assumed that to shirk this ordeal was in fact shameful. Selfpride alone will not force normal persons to swim Niagara or
swallow poison. They must feel that the deed is expected of them,
and rightly expected. They must expect it of themselves. In fact,
they must feel that to serve in the cause really is obligatory on all
self-respecting persons. They must admit the "ought", even though
they fulfill it only for self-pride. Of course, there were many who
went to the front for no reason whatever, but in response to herdsuggestion,
with no more loyalty than sheep who follow their leader.
But how did that suggestion ever come into being? It arose
amongst those for whom "duty" was a meaningful word, who
iudged, however reluctantly, that there is sometJiinq other than the
person of each that has a "claim" on each because of its intrinsic
a conflagration that

they loved.

;

;

;

—

goodness.

Some

of us. perhaps, are over cynical about Avar, or at least about

the motives of those

who

fought.

For we

incline to forget that, in
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when the spur and the comfortable promises of reli.e^ious
were both of them less compelling than of old, when the objectivity of good was doubted and the hope of immortality fading,
men freely gave themselves for the only ideal which seemed to
claim them.
As the religious faiths waned, the national faiths
Traditions of national dignity, righteousness and might
waxed.
an

a.ge

faith

seemed

more

improbable than the doctrines of the churches, and far
Moreover, patriotism was well within the capacity of

less

vivid.

was general, even among the eduFor the appeal of nationalism was two fold. It was easily

the schoolboy culture which alone
cated.

assimilated to our egoism

yet

;

it

offered us something to

thing other than, and greater than, our private selves.

serA-e, so'm,e-

This was

just

what we craved; on the one hand salvation for our self-esteem (so
crippled in the petty round of life), and on the other hand a clear
obligation, a dutv of service, however humble, in a great and vivid

Had

cause.
pulses,

its

escape

Had

war

offered satisfaction to one only of these im-

hold would have been less constant.

the one and

we

the

now

the other as our need varied

;

But it fulfilled now
and in no mood could

it.

the peoples been able to take Christianity to heart, they

would not have needed the psychical "release" afforded by passionate
nationalism. Their egoism would have found fulfillment in the certainty of eternal salvation and their loyalty might have found in the
Christ-god an object both vivid and universal. But since this could
not be, the nation was taken as a substitute, and war was the great
rite.
And the war, even if it has done nothing else of value, has.
It has
I should say, underlined in red two facts of human nature.
shown, on the one hand, how subtly egoism can disguise itself even
from itself, accepting even agony and death for mere pride. But,
on the other hand, it lias shown that self-disregarding loyalty is a
quite normal capacity of man, and a capacity which can becornve
active even on a superb scale when a clear call comes. "Cant!" says
the sceptic. But is it cant? Looking back to those days, remembering the details of the behaviour of our friends, and for that matter
our own heart-searchings, can we deny that each of us was determined to a greater or less extent by the cognition of values in relation to which our private needs were seen to be irrevelant.
But the nation is a sorrv substitute for the God of Love: and the
war disillusioned many. Nationalism, of course, is not yet seriously
in decline.
Even today most of us but seldom and hesitatingly
;
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Indeed on the fringes of our Western civilization it
spreads alarmingly and now it threatens to inflame even the East.
But, in the regions where it was born, patriotic zeal is perhaps tem-

transcend

it.

;

We

may hope that in time it may be reduced f ronn a
wholesome warmth in our hearts.
But the failure (or impending failure) of nationalism as a faith,
and of the nation as the supreme obiect of practical loyalty, forces
once more on the attention of thoughtful persons those ethical
problems which they had sought to ignore in a period of urgent
action. Those who are consciously troubled about these questions are
indeed few. Most folk consider ethical inquiry a priggish and futile
occupation. Yet these questions lurk in the background of all minds
and so they tend to get themselves answered inattentively, and to become the secret source of prejudice and savage behaviour.
Consider the outstanding movements of the day. They seem to
be Facism, Bolshevism, and a recrudescence of the more superstiFascism is accepted by
tious and preposterous "religious" sects.
those who, still paying respect to the older religion of Europe, but
pered

slightly.

conflagration to a

;

finding in nationalism the only

commanding

ideal,

can only conceive

Fascism
assumes the validity of the fundamental ethical concept.
Tt offers a faith, and exacts
devotion and therein lies its power.
Bolshevism equally makes
ethical assumptions.
Although it affects to despise ethics and metaphysics, and to reduce obligation to egoism, yet it is evidently felt
as a faith, and as an ideal which has an absolute claim on the faithful.
Thus in the days of widespread disillusionment any ideal, however
crude, however rationally indefensible, is felt to be better than no
loyaltv in terms of fear

assumes

its

and hate of

ideal uncritically.

rival nations .and parties.

Tt also uncritically

;

ideal at

all.

Both these rnovements owe their strength in part
doubt that increases as doubt becomes more insistent.

to a dread of

Both

satisfy

the craving for activity in a cause conceived as objectively important.

This phobia of uncertainty

is

perhaps also one source of the increase

of the cruder kinds of religious fanaticism.
as in the others, one motive

is

the desire for

In this case, of course,

mere personal

salvation,

world or another but it can scarcely be questioned that the
average fanatic, of whatever persuasion, does honestly feel that it is
supremely important, not for him, but for the world, that the flood
in this

:

dammed, and that his policy be followed as the only
means of world salvation. And thus it happens that an age of in-

of doubt be

:;
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creasing scepticism

many

Very

also an ag^e of increasing fanaticism.

is

persons have desperately shut their eyes and swallowed whole

whatever comforting or commanding
have wilHngly exposed themselves to
tical suggestion, till in time they have
state of faith.
On the other hand

attained a real, but artificial,

an increasing number have

from every kind of

definitely freed themselves

They

creed was available.

religious suggestion, or poli-

theological allegiance

while on the political side also there are signs of a growing dis-

Thus in both spheres, rewanes faith and frank un-

illusionment with established social ideals.
ligious

and

political,

is

it

lip-service that

;

faith alike increase.

men

not surprising that in an age of intellectual perplexity

It is

should take refuge either in irrational
pursuit of pleasure.

And mere

;

hand-to-mouth
evidently an in-

in a

pleasure-seeking

is

The old-fashioned unreasoned

creasing fever today.

being removed

dogma or

and there

an unabashed claim

is

restraints are

to free life, free

thought, free love, in short for the free "creative" exercise of

human

And

faculties.

of stuffy clothes and

means?

To

sufficient

end.

And

stufify

those

to

this pleasure

a prison.

It is

all

wholesome as a reaction from an age
But is freedom an end or a
morals.

is

the released captive

Yet

the end.

becomes

this

who

grows

it

indeed seems for a while a

lack pleasures, pleasure seems

and an aimless freedom

stale;

being well proved in these days that a

life

of

moreover is strangely
In our present disillusionment the only freedom to be

7nere impulse-satisfaction leads nowhere, and

unsatisfying.

sought

is,

it

seems, a free fling before the crash.

conviction of the futility of
to snatch joy before

Some

we

all

things that

is

it

eral disillusionment.

die.

They have devised

man from

all

a stoical ideal, which,

They have

himself creates the distinction between good and

take as our ideal (just because

it

pessimism

some

even

if

error.

is

pleases us to do so) freedom

intellectually justified, this

the pessimistic view
It

is

is

way

to an

from

Clear-

the only sane attitude.

mistaken, the stoic's

is

a whole-

was very necessary that we should learn not only

the irrationality of the older optimisms but also their banality.

only

said

We will

evil.

the tyranny of desire, and fearless contemplation of reality."

And

by

passing impulses, should enable him

to gain a kind of tragic triumph over the universe.

ly if

this

is

our fever

indeed have assumed a very different attitude in the gen-

emancipating

"Man

Surely

at the root of

optimism of

finer

mood,

if it

The

be intellectually possible

—
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at

perhaps throug-h heartfelt acceptance of pessimism.
What, then, is the most significant feature of our age?

all, is

we

be remembered chiefly for our social

conflicts,

Shall

for our inter-

national confusion, for the brilliant adolescence of science, or for our

These are the features that we, who are immersed
in today, see most clearly. Yet there is a more memorable fact about
the modern world, a fact which we scarcely notice. Ours is the age,
not simply of disillusionnlent, but of the vindication of man's
capacity for loyalty even in the teeth of disillusionment. For what
disillusionment?

has been happening since the days of secure faith? First, when the
ancient fear of hell was removed, men were discovered on the whole
not less but

more

And when later all the old beliefs
and even petty, men did not plung-e into

responsible.

began to seem legendary

individualism light-heartedly.

ism

at the

Desperately they

kind of topsy-turvy

itself a

ideal,

and

verv least they found excuses for

it,

made

of individual-

tried to be loyal to

means
of it, and

as being a

to

it

;

or

some

to look
Rut presently they began to tire
round for some more commanding object of loyalty. And so today,
along^side of the old religious objects, and the old uncriticised indi-

universal end.

thrive the cults of nationalism, bolshevism,

vidualisnT|,

fascism,

movements which, though deeply infused by man's self-regard,
would none of them be what they are, were they not also irradiated
by his unquenchable capacity for loyalty. But of these faiths bolshevism is the most glorious example of devotion in disillusionment.

Sown

in

contempt of human nature, it has flowered into a self-forby which, in spite of its intellectual wrong head-

getful enthusiasm

human nature is vindicated.
Xone of these faiths can withstand

edness,

dispassionate criticism. Each
must sooner or later seem incoherent and petty. And so, in
conflicting waves of disillusionment and devotion to new objects, and
again disillusionment, we live out our stormy age.
Never before,
perhaps, have the objects of loyalty been subjected to such keen
Never before has loyalty been driven so desperately from
criticism.
in turn

object to object in search of that which, of

command
live

allegiance.

Even when,

its

own

in the last extremity,

nature, can

men

try to

without any devotion whatever, they prove their essentially

loyal nature

away.

On

by

a sense of futility

the other

hand the

and

guilt that they

stoic, disillusioned

cannot explain

with

all other oban ideal of conduct. anJ
to achieve a precarious peace by pretending with all his might that

jects, is

driven to conceive in his

own mind
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which he beHeves to be a fig^ment of his personal taste, is yet
somehow of intrinsic and universal excellence.
Thus on all hands man's loyalty is vindicated. But to see that
loyalty is a real factor in human nature is not to answer those ancient ethical questions which all thoughtful persons needs must face
this,

Indeed, the mere prevalence of devotion to causes does not

today.
itself

prove even that loyalty ever

being by the intrinsic value of
secret

and primitive

is,

it

object,

its

itch of the

as

purports to be, called into

and not merely by some

experient himself.

Still

less is

it

between good and bad, on which
What do we
distinction.
really 111 ean when we speak of things as good and bad absolutely or
universally? What, if anything, can we mean intelligibly by such
phrases? Has "good" ultimately no meaning at all but "good for"
some conscious being or other? Or is our delight in the goodness
clear that the ethical distinction

loyalty claims to rest,

is

of a thing, not prior to

its

what sense "ought" a man

an

intelligible

goodness, but consequent on

it?

And

in

goods into being and
abolish bads?
What does it mean to say that he ought to do so
whether he wants to or not, and even that the act itself ought to be
to act so as to bring

done whether anyone admits the obligation or not?

And

further

if

the ethical distinction

not simply a delusion,

is

what kinds of things is it that in this actual world are good, and what
bad? And what is it that would be the ideal, the best of all? What
These latter indeed
is the end for which we all ought to be striving?
are the really interesting questions but clearly the others are more
fundamental. And perhaps the true answer to these fundamental
;

might turn out

ethical questions

to

be after

all

simply that they are

meaningless.

Such briefly are the well worn theoretical problems which, I sughave today become practical problems. Just because no ethical
theory is now taken for granted, a sound ethical science is needed,
whether its findings be positive or negative. Ethics has not hitherto
been a live issue and so the works of ethicists have mostly been abstract and remote. Only lately has ethical scepticism been not merely
propounded but deliberately put into practice. Only lately has it begun to break down well-established habits of behaviour. For today,
while much human conduct is still based on the old assumption of
the universality of good and bad, much also springs definitely from
gest,

;

the conviction that this distinction
differences

are carried

is

invalid.

into practice,

Now

that theoretical

our practice becomes more

,

!
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radically
in

and

bitterly discordant than ever before.

turn be revivified by

Not
but

all
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its

new

May

our theory

practical import

of us, indeed, are aware of the ethical problems explicitly

all

our

by the fact that there

lives are influenced

about them.

And

is

no agreement

at some time
Thev have, of coiu^se, been
and many times answered in terms

probably every intelligent person

is

or other painfullv conscious of them.

faced

many

times in the past,

Yet they remain for most of us still unand we crv out for a solution of them in our modern speech.
For just as physical science is finding itself no longer able to avoid
philosophical questions, so politics, social reform, and even the private life of each man and woman, are being influenced by doubts
whose nature is philosophical. In fact, there lurks in the background
of every mind today a profound ethical perplexity.
Of all these problems, one which is not strictly ethical, demands
consideration before the others.
Since ethical theories must be
founded in our everv'-day ethical experience, they must seek a true
of successive cultures.
soh-ed.

psychological account as to the nature of that experience.

gested by some psychologists that though to himself a
to

judge things good and bad

intrinsically,

and

It is

sug-

man seems

to render allegiance

to his ideals without reference to his private needs, really

he docs
whatever its form, appeals to him,
not because he sees that the world needs it, but because it "symboli-

His

nothing so simple.

ideal,

own which conwould probably dismiss as irrelevant, puerile, and perhaps even base. Thus our most admired "good" is displayed as but
cally satisfies" primitive or instinctive needs of his

sciously he

a pale approximation to the sweets of our childhood, or to the simple

pleasures of the instinctive animal.
so,

not because

it

really is

freed, but because,

AVho defends the oppressed does

"good" that these oppressed should be

meddling thus, he

satisfies his secret itch for the

"feel" of revolt.
If this

account

is

the whole truth about our ethical experience,

further ethical inquiry

is

a waste of time.

our value-judgments about things.
good, our judgment

And

if.

For

ethics derives

when we judge

from

a thing

determined not by that aspect of

it which we
some unnoticed and superficial similarity between the present situation and some situation
forgotten and irrelevant, clearly our value-judgment is no ground
for a science of ethics. For every value-judgment that claims to be

is

consciously declare to be good, but by

dispassionate, and rationally determined in relation to the objective
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world,

condemned

is

mere "rationalization" cloaking some

as

in-

stinctive prejudice.

Instinct psychology, however, in claiming to be a complete ac-

count of

human

behaviour,

falls into

rationalist

psychology which preceded

haviour

of one type.

is

Now

same extravagance
For it claims that

the
it.

possibly very

much

as the
all

be-

of our behaviour

and our valuing is as the instinct psychologists declare though we
might be more readily persuaded by them if they could agree amongst
themselves as to what an instinct is, and what instincts are. Waiving this protest, however, we may grant that many value- judgments
are formed "automatically", not in relation to all the tendencies of
;

the field of experience, but in relation only to an instinctive or
primitive core of organic or personal tendencies.

evident that every

man

It is,

indeed, very

often values and behaves, not in relation to

the greatest need which he himself cognizes in the real world, but

only

needs cognized in a certain part of the real world,

in relation to

namely in his own organism or in that system of objective needs
which constitutes his private self.
But we have attended lately too much to the abnormal and to the
primitive vestiges in man, forgetting his distinctively human attri-

We are not

butes.

veyor to

justified in regarding intelligence as solely a pur-

Even

instincts.

the purest instinctive conation involves an

environment, organic and extra organic, and involves cognition of

some tendency objective to the conative act itself. At every stage,
which are conated are tendencies cognized in an
At every stage conation
objective environment, private or public.
then, tendencies

presupposes cognition of an objective tendency.
then, to declare that one

mode

veloped mode,

is

intelligence

not merely to find

more

alone unable to determine conations.

familiar tendencies

nition"),

new

is,

We have no

reason,

of cognition, and in fact the most de-

means

The

ofBce of

for the satisfaction of the

(apprehended by a more primitive cog-

but to penetrate further into the environment and discover

tendencies which, in their

own

right shall be accepted as grounds

of conation.

Thus

it

that the goals of instinct are progressively criticised

is

and subordinated

to

wider ends, which

in

simply "derived" from the ends of instinct.
well be, as

was admitted above,

behavior often
larly,

it

may

resist control

well be that

no

significant sense are

But, of course,

that established automatic

it

may

modes of

by newly cognized tendencies. Simiare mere "auto-

many value-judgments
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matisms",

in that

characters

that

suppose that

they are valuingfs of things merely for unessential

happen

all

afford

to

value- judgment

instinct

satisfaction.

But

to

necessarily determined only by

is

cognition of innate organic tendencies, or by innate "psycho-physiis to misunderstand the essential nature of conation,

cal dispositions",

to misrepresent

and

human behaviour

the three grave doubts which

Of

we have dismissed

this discussion

We

at the

opening of

the cosmological problem as

and the psychological attack on

relevant,
valid.

for the sake of a theory.

were noted
ethics has

now appeared

ir

in-

are left with the strictly ethical questions as to the
and obligation, and the concrete nature of the

status of goodness

All that has been done is to show on the one hand that these
ideal.
questions are urgent and on the other that they do not appear meaningless when we look closely into the psychological nature of the

experience which gives rise to them.

But there

cuss these problems here.
discussion, and

often strayed,

it

I

may now

fittingly

think, through

impossible to dis-

It is clearly
is

a task preliminary to such a

false

assumptions as to the

They have

character of the fundamental ethical experience.
torted their data to

fit

Ethicists have

be undertaken.

making

their theories.

The

dis-

only hope of advance

seems to lie in a more careful introspection of the ethical situation
it appears to the ordinary man when he is not sophisticated by any

as

doctrine.

To

I

venture, therefore, to summarize

and

follows,

to suggest that

it

is

my own

experience as

typical.

I find, is to be forced to choose
one tendency cognized as in the world and fulfilling another tendency cognized as in the world. For instance, it may
be that on the one hand my person, which is one factor in the

be faced with a moral choice,

between

fulfilling

and

freely

act

my

on the other hand

that

free activity

whole.

and develop without a certain thing,
having that thing would prevent the
of another person, or of society, or the world as a

cannot

world,

In such a situation,

which would

T

find that

I call

that course the better

(I believe) result in the objectively

most complete

ful-

filment of the world as a whole, whether the seat of that fulfilment

be within

my

private person or elsewhere.

What

I

mean by "good"

thus turns out to be simply the fulfilling of objective tendencies.

by "the ideal"

I

find that

T

And

nican the most complete fulfilment of the

capacities of the universe.
I

certainly do not

have when

I

am

mean by "good"

the pleasant feeling that

aware of the fulfilment of

some tendency of

I

my
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person or of the world at large.

mean

I

the fulfilment

itself.

Nor

suppose for a moment that the ideal is simply that all folk
should be pleased always. Everything depends on what it is that

do

I

pleases them.

If

they are pleased with the fulfilment of petty ten-

dencies only, the ideal

not realized.

is

A

universal tipsy beatitude

would not be ideal.
Nor do I mean by "good" simply the fulfilment of my own
personality, unless by "my personality" be meant the real of which
my mental content is but a fragmentary and distorted appearance.
But to call this "my personality", and its tendency toward fulfil-

ment "my

real will"

to be the ideal

mental content
because

it

confusing.

is

Of

course,

1

can only judge that

which would constitute the greatest fulfilment of
;

but

I

call

purports to be

it

tlie

so,

not because

it

is

my

my

fulfilment, but

zuorld's fulfilment.

Faced with a moral choice, I may see quite clearly which course
would lead to the better result, and yet I may choose the other. I
may, that is, cognize tendencies that are more important objectively
than those which alone determine my conation. On such occasions
But I do not suppose that
there may be a painful discord in me.
the wrongness of my choice consists in my having produced this discord in myself, or in mv having violated my own "real will" for selffulfilment. The wrongness of my choice is experienced as consisting
in the fact that certain objectively minor tendencies of the world
have fulfilled themselves through my will at the expense of certain
objectively major tendencies.
The moral experience, then, is less truly expressed by the proposition, "I feel that I ought to do so and so", than by the propositions,
"I judge that so and so ought to be done; and further that it ought
to be done by me".
The "ought" is experienced as deriving not
from my nature as a "moral agent", but from the world's nature as
pressing toward fulfilment. Or, lest this phrase should seem to imply
some theory as to the nature of the world as a whole, perhaps it
were better to say simply that the "ought" is experienced as deriving
from the nature of whatever objects are cognized as pressing toward
fulfilment.

In

some such terms

scribed.

And whatever

as these the moral experience
difficulties

must be de-

are thus raised, the essential

features of this description must be respected by any theory that

claims to solve those

ask

how

difficulties.

For

instance,

we must

of course

the tendency of the world, or of objects in the world can
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have any "claim"on
in

some sense

me

unless

/ really will

my

tendency, unless

And we must answer

in the first place

it is

it.

in

some sense

that indeed the tendency of the world has no "claim" on

"demanded" by the world.

co.g^nize it as

"on me" or not.

it

And when

world.

because

it is

a claim

is
it

in

my

ternal" world than in

my

In conating at

part of the world.

It is

me

and

to conate at

mv

is.

all.

not that

moved

being

my

all

Were

nothing to conate.

of

to say

it

is

on me,

me

unless /

is

a claim

it

a tendency of the

it

is

so felt sinvply

There

is

really

no

being moved to conate a tendency of the "ex-

dency, say the tendency of

true mvsterv

is

cognized as a tendency of the world.

more mystery

hausted.

that

as a claim

felt

is

;

But whether

I

body

to conate

to rest

when

any "private" tenits

tissues are ex-

accept a tendency congnized in

there no such cognition

I

some

should have

the objective tendency itself which arouses
sets the direction of
I

my

conation.

Thus

the

should ever conate the greatest fulfilment

cognized world, but that

T

should ever conate anything

less.

.Knvbow, whatever be tbe true solution of the difficulties raised by
moral experience, no solution can be true which mis-states the data

found in the plain man's daily life.
These problems as to the abstract form of goodness and the
logical ground of obligation constitute only the first and least interesting task for the ethicist.

them we should be

Having arrived

entitled to pass

present naive ignorance

we may,

on

at

some

solution of

to discover, so far as in

our

the concrete nature of the objective

Taking into account all that we know of our world, and all
we have good reason to surmise, we must try to fashion, as
precisely as may be, an image of our goal.
Such an image, vivid,
ideal.

that

all comprehensive, is very urgently needed today.
When
were accepted there was no will to seek the gods. But when
the idols rot, and despairingly we find no good in anything, then at
least there is hope that we may glimpse tnie values.

believable,
idols

